Différentes acceptions d’immanence et de transcendance dans la phénoménologie d’Edmund Husserl

In this article the author reconsiders the husserlian conception of intentionality within the framework of immanence and transcendence. Beginning with an analysis of the transmission of the concept of intentionality from Brentano to Husserl, the author tries to show in which way the following “transcendental turn” generates different understandings of immanence and transcendence. It will thus turn out that only a consideration of the interdependency between these different understandings of immanence and transcendence will give access to a truly phenomenological understanding of intentionality. The subsequent analysis of Husserl’s reflections on immanent and pre-immanent time consciousness will then furnish new understandings of immanence and transcendence that will complicate the mentioned interdependency between these two.