Call for papers

K.
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Truth and Politics

Kierkegaard's desire

Our hypothesis is that in Kierkegaard's philosophy it is hidden a thought capable of expressing the political value of the inconceivable; that is, when, by apparently remaining ourselves, we actually become unrecognisable first and foremost to those who know us very well. In Kierkegaard, then, an ultra-political charge related to the full suspension of any Law, even ethical ones, would tacitly stir. Quite simply, we would like to call this gesture the event of the impossible. If and whenever this happens (but can it actually happen?), the it causes a deflagration of everything, even one's own name or, perhaps, above all one's own name. Everything, even the most beloved and desired, loses its weight and value. Philosophy, customs, desires, priorities, religious norms, good manners, ethical aspirations, are thrown into the area the moment we are called to a leap that pushes us towards a form of radical hiding: we become unrecognisable to anyone.

In Kierkegaard, the most radical materialisation of a liberation capable of exceeding all conditions is the Abraham of *Fear and Trembling* (1843). Abraham breaks every bond when he separates himself from death, because he is willing to die as a father, a husband, a good man, losing all his symbolic arrogance. He is willing to "cope without" (but not without violence) any familiarity with his own beloved family. He thus shows a determination un-heard of, that absurdly reminds us of Medea's. Abraham is a warrior, a ruthless being, therefore, because he has freed himself from the burden of death; that is, both from the sovereignty of destructive enjoyment and from the presumption of those who would know how to discern good from evil (we cannot, one might almost say naturally, not think in this regard of Robert Bresson's *Diary of a Country Priest*). He becomes inhuman because he suspends, without providing reasons, all forms of association (perhaps it is in this sense that Derrida spoke of Abraham as the other, he becomes intractable by questioning the violence of identity). When Abraham strips himself of any ethical presumption, he does no longer make of his own life a sequence of losses, because he no longer recognises any function of the law, not even that of the father he wanted to be.

Abraham, then, chooses the choice; that is, he abandons all forms of abstraction, of predetermined position (husband, father, shepherd), and decides for the impossible, which at that point, only at that moment, however things are going to turn out, coincides with his very existence. Here, Abraham believes in the impossible, that the impossible, despite being almost unimaginable, can happen. It is this faith in an absence, in a thing that is not (yet) there, that sets in motion a revolution that shatters all relations with the historical world, his world, the world of his innermost affections. Therefore, if Abraham becomes the centre of gravity of an ethical community, the family, this happens only so that this nucleus can be torn apart, shaken by a jolt that leaves mute and revokes any separation between good and evil, responding to a greater command, which dismisses everything, even love. Abraham, when he leaves home, called to do away with love, the weight of death, every known principle, finds himself

beyond good and evil, placed beyond all responsibility, to assume a greater one. For Kierkegaard, in fact, only he who is not (any longer) a Christian can become one; he who calls himself a Christian, on the other hand, cannot be one, because he cannot experience his becoming other than himself. In this experience of radical difference, then, Abraham defies all logic and opens himself to another dimension.

The Kierkegaardian religious appears almost inexplicable; it is an incommunicable experience: there is nothing to say. Abraham has nothing to teach; he is silent: he reaches the limit of an experience that is, indeed, inexplicable. More precisely, he makes his own a paradoxical, absurd gesture, free of everything. At bottom, this is the reason that drives Kierkegaard to conceive philosophy as an experience that has no name; or rather, has many names. Having many names is the condition for philosophy to reveal its greatest, classical imposture: that of claiming to tell the truth. It is a well-known fact, in fact, that Kierkegaard signed his speculative books with a series of pseudonyms committed (almost) to misleading (but even misleading must not become a constraint), tracing a furrow between life and work, fomenting a game of Chinese boxes, in *Enten-Eller* taken to the extreme, between what can be said and what is said (the invention of names with which Kierkegaard initials many of his books, leaving his *mark*, is very famous: Victor Hermit, Johannes de Silentio, Constantin Constantius, Anti-Climacus).

Who is speaking? And on whose behalf does he speak? Who can speak the truth? Can one speak the truth? The philosophical problem of who speaks the truth in Kierkegaard takes on an extraordinary urgency because it is concerned with the most essential bowels of the human, implying a taking leave of life. For whoever dares to say, because he knows, what truth is, is evading life; its most mysterious and concrete trait that coincides, for Kierkegaard, with an unspeakable rest, even difficult to think about. This is why Kierkegaard's writing appears tormented, almost stalked by a phantom, which disrupts its consistency: non-writing. Non-writing is Kierkegaard's greatest desire, the desire placed beyond any object, consumption, beyond any (aesthetic) vocation of the subject: that of demolishing everything he touches/desires. Non-writing is the radical taking of leave of the *thing*.

But Kierkegaard writes. Why does he do so? We could make it very simple: to bear witness to non-writing. Kierkegaard decides to inhabit the antinomy of writing, bearing witness to non-writing, but at the same time taking on the deception that all writing brings with it. The anguish associated with all forms of desire takes up its home here: the anguish of repetition; the condition capable of releasing the greatest desolation. And yet, Abraham is not an afflicted man: he sets out on his journey; in spite of himself and those he loves, in spite of every good reason and in spite of making *no sense*.

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The issue that the journal K. devotes to Kierkegaard's philosophy invites proposals that should focus on the following topics:

1) The theme of the name in Kierkegaard as a radical questioning of the subject that speaks and claims to speak the truth. Philosophy, in other words, as the experience of the nameless.

2) The question of the aesthetic in Kierkegaard as a remarkable stake in the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan, Deleuze).

3) Readings of Kierkegaard capable of deciphering in his philosophy a gesture of radical dismissal of the self, of the ethical, of philosophy itself: Badiou, Kafka, Derrida, etc.

4) Faith in Kierkegaard as materialisation of the impossible and suspension of any determined ethical instance.

5) Keeping Kierkegaard's experience as an inescapable centre of gravity, coming to terms with the space of writing as radical self-revocation and permanent attraction for the unspeakable.

6) Kierkegaard the political thinker.

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Submit your proposal by 10 May 2025 (max. 2,500 characters)

Send to: krevuecontact@gmail.com

If the proposal is accepted, the paper must be delivered by 10 October 2025.

After this date, the selected paper will be automatically excluded from the journal issue.